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SPECIAL PERSPECTIVE

The Need for and the Role of
Comparative and
Cross-Cultural Perspectives in
Behavioral-Science-and-Law Scholarship
David Carson, L.L.B.,
and Alan J. Tomkins, J.D., Ph.D.
Behavioral-science-and-law scholarship suﬀers from the lack of many
activities examining issues from a comparative or cross-cultural perspective. Although U.S. contributions tend to be the most insular, the
problem applies to virtually all behavioral-science-and-law endeavors.
This special perspective examines the trend in behavioral-science-andlaw scholarship) presents data to support the allegation that there are
few comparative/cross-cultural contributions) oﬀers explanations for
the situation, and advocates for the introduction of more comparative/cross-cultural eﬀorts in the future.

THE PROBLEM
There is a paucity of comparative scholarship on behavioral-science-and-law issues. Despite
the proliferation of behavioral-science-and-law activities during the past two decades (see,
e.g.. Bull & Carson, 1995; Hess & Weiner, in press; Kagehiro & Laufer, 1992; Monahan &
Walker, 1994; Small & Weiner, 1993; see generally, Melton, Huss, & Tomkins, in press; Ogloﬀ, Tomkins, & Bersoﬀ, 1996); despite the international membership of such organizations
as the American Psychology-Law Society, the American Association of Correctional Psychology, the European Association of Psychology and Law (EAPL), the International Academy of Law and Mental Health, and the Law and Society Association; despite the fact that
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behavioral-science-and-law conferences attract participants from around the world (although most participants come from North America, Western Europe) and Australia/New
Zealand, participants also come from Eastern Europe, Asia, and South and Central America); and despite the proliferation of behavioral-science-and-law journals with international
editorial boards, most behavioral-science-and-law research and writing ignores an international or comparative perspective. The American behavioral-science-and-law community
seems to be the most “guilty” of ignoring international and comparative perspectives (see
Carson & Tomkins, 1996).
U.S. CULPABILITY
Both U.S.-based, behavioral-science-and-law journals and the work published in these
journals reﬂect the focus on “America”—American authors, American issues, and American
references/citations. By way of example, we will focus on Behavioral Sciences & the Law; although we restrict our ﬁnger-pointing to this journal, a similar claim could be made for
Law and Human Behavior and probably for the other major, behavioral-science-and-law
journals published in the U.S.
Consider the most recent issues of Behavioral Sciences & the Law (volumes 13 (1995)
and 14 (1996), issues 1–4, and volume 15 (1997), issue 1). The nine BS&L issues covering Vol. 13(1) to Vol. 15(1) contained 61 articles. Nine special topics were examined.
(BS&L is a special topics journal, though it also publishes Research Reports, Special Perspectives, and other kinds of articles as well.) The nine Special Topics were “Psycholegal Aspects of Death,” “Behavioral Science Evidence in the Wake of Daubert” “Aging and the
Law,” “Psychological Testing and the Law,” “Biomedical Innovation,” and “Professional Liability.” Fifty-four of the 61 articles were Special Topics articles. In addition, there were ﬁve
Research Reports and two Special Perspectives. The 61 articles published in the journal reﬂect the array of activities and approaches (e.g., some empirical contributions, some conceptual contributions, some reviews of legal and/or psychological literatures) that generally
characterize behavioral-science-and-law research and writing.
Of the 61 articles, over 90% of the ﬁrst authors were aﬃliated with American institutions or agencies at the time of publication (57/61, though in one instance the ﬁrst author had initiated his work in Canada before joining an American university for graduate
school). Three of the four other articles had Canadian-aﬃliated ﬁrst authors (in one instance, the ﬁrst author initiated the work in Canada but was aﬃliated with a university in
England at the time of publication); the remaining author was from Australia. Most of the
articles focused exclusively on American behavioral-science-and-law perspectives, although
many of the articles dealt with issues that are germane outside of the U.S. The only explicitly comparative project that was reported on during this period was from one of the ﬁrstauthor-from Canada articles (i.e., Peterson, Stephens, Dickey, & Lewis, 1996). An examination of the references reveals that the vast majority are from U.S.-based publications.
(It is possible that some of the U.S. references were actually written by non-American authors.) Thus, as expected, it appears that American-authored articles almost universally use
only North American (i.e., U.S. and Canadian) perspectives and references.
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There are several possible explanations for the insular approach to behavioral-scienceand-law scholarship reﬂected in the BS&L articles. It could be argued that an Americanrun journal is likely to attract contributions primarily from American (and Canadian) authors. It could be argued that the topics selected were focused on American issues and that
they did not warrant an international or comparative perspective. It also could be argued
that non-American publications are fewer and of more recent vintage (e.g., European behavioral-science-and-law journals have trailed U.S. journals by at least a decade in terms
of numbers of journals, and the general interest in behavioral-science-and-law outside the
U.S. seems to be about a decade—or more—behind what has been happening in the U.S.
and Canada), so there is less of an opportunity to use non-American sources. Such arguments are lamentable in some instances, and inaccurate in others.
The fact that a journal is coordinated by Americans does not explain the lack of nonAmerican contributions. American medical journals regularly publish work from non-U.S.
researchers. What are medical journals doing to attract non-American publications that behavioral-science-and-law journals are not? Although one might wonder whether non-Americans are submitting manuscripts but not getting them published, the experience of one of
us (AJT) does not bear out that hypothesis. BS&L is not receiving many manuscripts from
non-U.S./Canadian authors. Assuming it is true that BS&L and other American, behavioral-science-and-law journals attract few non-American contributors, then it is a problem
for the ﬁeld. As attested by the numbers and the quality of presentations at EAPL meetings, there are many potential articles that could be published in American journals.
The foci of the Special Topics also do not adequately explain the dearth of authors and/
or perspectives from outside the U.S. and an American legal case (the “Evidence in the
Wake of Daubert” issue), all of the topics—even the Daubert issue—have relevance and applications outside the U.S./Canada, Each of the issues could have beneﬁted from an international or comparative perspective.
The fact that there are so few references to non-American scholarship is not likely attributable to the availability (or lack thereof ) of sources outside the U.S. As we will discuss below, Europeans regularly cite to works from Europe, Australia, and New Zealand,
along with works from the U.S. and Canada. If Europeans can ﬁnd these works, so could
Americans.
The most likely explanation for the observed pattern is the insularity of Americans. This
insularity permeates U.S. society. It is reﬂected in most Americans knowing only English
and no other language, most Americans knowing little about non-American arts and culture, and so on. There is no reason to expect that Americans change their ways simply because they have become behavioral-science-and-law professionals.
The lack of international perspectives and/or comparative projects is disappointing. The
lack is not attributable to ignorance of a comparative point of view. American law schools
typically oﬀer courses in international law and courses that examine American law in light
of its English roots (e.g., property law). The European roots of American psychology routinely are explored in “History and Systems” courses. American social psychology has long
had a tradition of thinking about issues from the viewpoint of the “Martian” who just
landed in our midst. Yet, despite the exposures to non-American materials and despite the
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traditions of looking outside the American context, most American behavioral-scienceand-law scholarship focuses on American topics, uses American social scientiﬁc sources,
and discusses only American Law.
OUTSIDE THE U.S.
Is it diﬀerent elsewhere? For example, are European journals and European scholars as
likely to be immersed in their own culture as are Americans? Would the author-aﬃliation
pattern display the same kind of geographical bias represented in BS&L?
To compare the BS&L situation, we looked at a European journal similar to BS&L. The
journal. Expert Evidence, is the ﬁrst European journal speciﬁcally focusing on behavioral
science and law issues. It is edited by two scholars from Britain, including one of the authors of this article (DC). We examined the 62 articles published in Expert Evidence since
its inception in 1992.
The publication pattern was diﬀerent for EE than for BS&L. Slightly over 60% of the
ﬁrst authors were based in the U.K. (38/62), which means that almost 40% of the ﬁrst-authors were from outside the U.K. Eight were from other parts of Europe, nine were from
the U.S., and seven from elsewhere. Put another way, roughly 25% of Expert Evidence articles were from outside Europe.
Clearly, Expert Evidence readers are more likely to be learning about international perspectives than readers of Behavioral Sciences & the Law. Moreover, citations to non-U.K.
sources are commonplace in Expert Evidence (as they are for all other European-based journals that address behavioral-science-and-law issues). Indeed, citations are not simply to
works from the U.K. or the U.S. Large numbers of articles include references from additional, albeit primarily English-language, sources.
What about comparative projects? Overall, articles in the issues of Expert Evidence were
far more concerned with matters outside of the U.K. than articles in Behavioral Sciences
& the Law were concerned with matters outside of North America, For example, ﬁve articles in a special issue of Expert Evidence (Volume 4, Issue 3) discussed an American judicial
opinion (United States v. Shonubi, 1995). One article was a consensus statement reached by
an international group of scholars (Lamb, 1994). Still, only ﬁve of the articles in EE could
be described as “comparative” in that the article explicitly considered the laws of two or
more countries (e.g., McCormack, 1993) or examined a behavioral-science-and-law issue
across jurisdictions (e.g., Gatowski, Dobbin, Richardson, Nowlin, & Ginsburg, 1996; cf.
Gatowski, Dobbin, Richardson, & Ginsburg, this issue).
These data—for whatever their worth—suggest that a European behavioral-science-andlaw journal may be more likely to publish work from scholars outside the editors jurisdiction than an American journal. There appears to be a greater likelihood of ﬁnding an extrajurisdictional citation/reference in a European journal than in an American journal. But
our examination also revealed that truly comparative works are few in the behavioral-science-and-law literature. Why are there so few comparative projects?
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A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE LACK OF
COMPARATIVE SCHOLARSHIP
A major barrier to comparative projects is the diﬃculty in such undertakings. The reasons
why a particular country has developed a particular law, let alone its procedures, are complex, and simplistic applications of one jurisdiction^ practices or rules may not be at all
fruitful. Cross-cultural studies can only be suggestive in many instances.
We believe that another important factor to explain the lack of comparative work is the
pragmatic and practitioner orientation of behavioral-science-and-the-law studies. We think
that behavioral-science-and-law research agenda has been substantially set by lawyers and
the needs of courts.
A similar observation was made by Steadman and his MacArthur Mental Health Law
Research Network colleagues (1993). They noted how perceptions of the issues in risk assessment have been shaped by courts’ interests rather than clinicians’ interests. And if the
law is going to shape the research agenda, then we might anticipate that the resultant inquiry will be national, problem orientated, parochial even.
A related pragmatic concern is that comparative or international perspectives ﬁnd a
chilly welcome by the targeted legal community. A recent inquiry in the United Kingdom
serves as a case-in-point (Rundman, 1993). Public disquiet with the number of high proﬁle wrongful convictions led to the British government establishing a Royal Commission
to examine the criminal justice system. They were oﬃcially encouraged to consider recommending adoption of a more investigatory trial system, as dominant in the rest of Europe.
However the Royal Commission’s consideration of the case for such a dramatic change was
cursory. They thought it too radical a step given the weight of tradition, and the Commission felt that some of the claims for the investigatory system were overstated. Nor was, for
example, the research on decision-making and common causes of error considered. But
then there is little active debate about the respective merits of diﬀerent trial systems (McEwan, 1992). Changing trial systems would be too radical, so it is most unlikely to occur
and it is, therefore, not worth serious consideration.
In general, U.K. scholarship typically does not examine law and practice in Denmark,
the Netherlands, or other European countries (unless the inquiry examines a speciﬁc law
relating to the European Community). This is similar, of course, to the U.S.
It is interesting to note that to the extent there is an exception to the “lack of comparative scholarship^ criticism, the exception seems to emanate from “Commonwealth”
countries. Canadian scholarship often compares Canadian rules and practices to the U.S.
As a general matter, scholarship from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand often includes
a comparison to Britain, to the U.S., and to other Commonwealth countries (see, e.g.,
Freckelton, this issue).
The Commonwealth situation suggests the possibility that under certain circumstances
(perhaps circumstances of culture and of history), there is a greater likelihood (than in
the absence of such circumstances) that behavioral-science-and-law scholars will undertake
comparative eﬀorts. However, even Commonwealth scholars are not producing a large corpus of comparative literature.
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THE NEED FOR AND THE ROLE OF
COMPARATIVE SCHOLARSHIP
As we have already conceded, comparative studies are not simple. Indeed the main role for
comparative studies may be in stretching the imagination. It can remind us that there are
a range of diﬀerent ways in which particular issues can be conceived and tackled. How do
other countries conceptualize the criminal responsibility of people with mental disorders?
How do they ensure appropriate responses to their crimes? How have particular responses
come to be perceived as “appropriate” by the diﬀerent powerful interests groups?
Despite the problems in comparing diﬀerent systems, diﬀerent cultures, and so on,
comparative research has great potential. Indeed, American legal scholarship regularly compares practices and laws across the States. International perspectives oﬀer the possibilities of
examining issues from a new, fresh perspective and it does so without the need to rely on
Martians. Intel-nationalization oﬀers the possibility of allowing researchers and commentators to consider alternative perspectives in dealing with problems. Indeed, a comparative approach to conceptualizing behavioral-science-and-law problems and their solutions
prompts an advantageous broadening of horizons by forcing the consideration of additional ways of “doing business” and solving problems.
It is our position that a considerable amount of behavioral-science-and-law research and
writing would beneﬁt from a comparative perspective. Although we do not go so far as to
argue that the bulk of it should be cross-cultural, the virtual absence of any of it is a significant omission. A comparative perspective might prompt one to wonder whether developments in American mental health/justice systems interactions have been driven by a legal
agenda and whether behavioral scientists have been responding, perhaps too uncritically, to
legal deﬁnitions of problems or to lawyers’ pragmatic needs for assistance in trials. The defense of diminished responsibility, in England and Wales for example, involves expert evidence being given on the defendants “mental responsibility^ for his or her acts. Clinicians
will give evidence on this issue even though the questions would be more appropriately
posed to philosophers, moralists, and clerics. Perhaps we should be more open in recognizing the extent to which the agenda in law and behavioral sciences is being driven by reformist motives and concern to achieve what is perceived to be the best outcome for individual clients. The adversarial legal system has a very strong inﬂuence over the agenda.
Expert evidence issues provide a case in point. Expert evidence is something of great import to mental health professionals (see, e.g., Faust & Ziskin, 1988), and it is an issue apparently of great concern to legal systems throughout the world (e.g., Bernstein, 1996;
Freckelton & Selby, 1995; Nijboer, 1992; Odgers & Richardson, 1995). Understanding
expert evidence would be facilitated by analyses of the ways that diﬀerent jurisdictions with
their contrasting legal systems—for example, the use of investigatory rather than adversarial, judges as fact-ﬁnders—treat novel scientiﬁc information. Expert evidence issues may be
inﬂuenced by the diﬀerent legal tests that are used across legal systems—for example, differences in tests of a litigant’s “capacity” across jurisdictions—and analyses of the nexus between legal tests, of opportunities for litigant participation in legal proceedings, and of
how communities’ norms of justice inﬂuence legal rules and practices could help develop a
more sophisticated understanding of expert evidenced role in the complex legal systems in
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which such evidence is used. At a minimum, diﬀerences provide valuable opportunities for
comparative research. In each jurisdiction there is concern about the eﬀects of lawyers’ examination techniques on the presentation and understanding of expert evidence. There is
also concern about the quality of the scientiﬁc evidence being oﬀered and those speaking
to it. These are not just local problems. Law may be national) but science is international.
We think that many of these issues could—and should—be addressed at a more international level. Behavioral-science-and-law scholarship can—and should—be targeted to issues of international law) international institutions) and to the international network of
law commissions and similar bodies. Politicians and commentators are telling us that we
live in a global economy; behavioral-science-and-law scholars operate in a global environment as well. Contributions can span numerous possibilities. Where are developing countries to get their expert evidence from? How will, and how should) the internet be used as
a means of providing expert evidence? The Netherlands allows defendants to have second
DNA samples tested in the laboratories of another country—what other kinds of expert
information could equally proﬁt from crossing borders?
We realize that there will be many problems in conducting comparative research. For
example) diﬀerences in cross-examination styles between the U.K. and U.S. (though both
involve adversarial systems) may result in a researcher’s detection of diﬀerences that might
be attributed to jurisprudential diﬀerences between the two systems. It is imperative to ensure the proper development of research protocols and interpretation of research data.
In conclusion) it is probably not overstating the case to accuse U.S. scholars of being the
most myopic when it comes to adopting an international perspective. But then European
scholars have had the advantage that they have simply had to look to North America if
they wished to develop their interests. Americans) of course, cover so much geography and
have such international importance when it comes to science and to law. Nevertheless) we
believe that the trend toward globalization found in industry) politics) culture) and so on
should be reﬂected in some behavioral-science-and-law inquiries) too. There is the potential
for making important contributions if we increase the internationalization of perspectives
in relevant research and writing. A more comparative approach also surely will help to redress the balance and allow behavioral scientists to shape the scholarship agenda more persuasively. We encourage members of the behavioral-science-and-law communities to keep
international perspectives in mind.
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